

Libya in Post Muammar Ghadaffi Era

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ABSTRACT

This study addressed the outcome of the Libyan crisis in the post Ghadaffi years. During the reign of Ghadaffi, Libya was the largest oil producer in Africa and also the best in terms of Human Development Index (HDI) in Africa during the reign of late Colonel Muammar Ghadaffi. The emergence of the Arab springs in January 2011 led to the overthrow of Ghadaffi in Libya because of his inability to return the country to liberal democracy, corruption, human right abuses, and anti-western positions, among others. The outcome of the crisis was the wanton destruction of lives, properties, and the proliferation of armed groups occupying strategic areas with different agendas in the country. The consequence of this is that Libya which is the pride and tourist destination in Africa is now becoming a failed state, in the quest for freedom and liberal democracy. This study examined the critical issues that presently shape the future of Libya, particularly the disruption in its political, economic and social progress since 2001. Primary and secondary sources were adopted, as interviews were conducted with relevant bodies and agencies in this research. The study urges the International community to stop funding armed groups and agree on a ceasefire and settlement so that democracy, peace and stability can return to Libya.

Keywords: Democracy-Peace-Arab springs-Liberalism-Reconciliation-Stability- Truce.

INTRODUCTION

Libya is fourth in size among the countries of Africa and seventeenth among the countries of the world. *Libya* is bounded by the Mediterranean Sea on the north, Egypt on the east, Sudan on the southeast, Niger and Chad on the south, and Tunisia and Algeria on the west. (Ansani & Daniele, 2011) It has an area of 1.76kilometers and the capital is Tripoli. Phoenicians settled in Tripolitania in western Libya, which was hitherto populated by Berbers in the 7th century BC. (M. Beissinger, A. Jamal, and K. Mazur, 2012) In the 4th century BC, Greeks colonized Cyrenaica in the east of the country, which they called Libya, while the Romans took over Libya in the 4th BC. In 643 AD, Arabs conquered Libya and spread Islam and by 16th century Libya became part of the Ottoman Empire, which joined the three provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan into one regency in Tripoli. **Between 1911-12**, Italy seized Libya from the Ottomans. Omar al-Mukhtar begun 20-year insurgency against Italian rule and by 1942 – Allied forces ousted Italians from Libya, which was then divided between the French and the British. In 1951, Libya became independent under King Idris al-Sanusi.

AN OVERVIEW OF LIBYA UNDER GHADAFFI

Muammar Ghadaffi seized power through coup in 1969. His purportedly socialist political system of “Jamahiriya” razed civil society and centralized the government around his sultanistic rule, characterized by his clan’s men. *The Green Book* and other texts formed Gaddafi into the “Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution,” (Al Mahdi, 2014) at once titleless and the essence of a state closed to popular participation. This system of control, while bestowed with large welfare programs to buy loyalty, drove Libya into economic distress and failed to reap the benefits of oil endowments in the earliest years of Gaddafi rule. Gaddafi remained strong throughout his rule in his domestic and foreign policy for Libya.

Gaddafi condemned the Arab protests as it became obvious that Libya would be affected, extending his 1973 rhetoric of dissenters as “stray dogs” (Winkler 2013) to describe angry protesters and challengers in Benghazi as “rats” and “cockroaches” to be exterminated.(Musareef Edareeya,2020) As the National Transition Committees’ (NTC) anti-regime protests expanded, Gaddafi’s response was defensive, rallying supporters and refusing to

cede control and power to the people. This defensive posturing remained unchanged throughout the conflict as he rejected UN sanction of his actions, denied human rights abuses, and deployed security forces for violent scorched earth policies to root out dissent and insurrections.

Under Gaddafi, education and health care were free for all citizens. Masareef Edareeya claimed the quality of education and health was appalling but that does nothing to the fact that it was free. Gaddafi heavily subsidized the health sector in Libya. Mercy Corps corroborated this fact corroborated by admitting that Libya health system under Gaddafi not be matched by what the so called “democratic leaders” can do for their countries.

Before the revolution, Gaddafi’s government had legislation providing for a grant to newlyweds to buy their first apartment so as to help start a family. Although, Monsur Abdulfattah claims that the process was tedious and bureaucratic to the extent that not many people bothered to follow it through but the \$50,000 was there if one followed through. (Monsur Abdulfattah, 2020) Mercy Corps also supported that claims that Gaddafi provided housing for newlyweds. (Mercy Corps, 2017)

In 1986, the Gaddafi regime also embarked on great projects such as the Great Man-Made River Project to make water available to the whole country. It is important to note that, Libya is in a desert region and Gaddafi’s plan to ascertain every citizen of access was the Great Man-Made River Project. Libya had no external debt and had reserves of \$150 billion most of which were frozen globally due to unending sanctions by western leaders and international financial institutions. While United States which wanted Libya to be democratized by spreading capitalism and democracy own debt of \$18 trillion. (Hanson, 2012) Libya was not indebted to any credit institutions during the Gaddafi regime.

In 1990, Human Development Report survey of countries in the world ranked Libya 53 of 163 countries with comparable data. The HDI of Arab states was 0,641 while Libya’s was 0,760. This indicated that Libya during the regime of Gaddafi was far better than other Arab countries and some in Western Europe. The HDI provided a composite measure of health, education and income. In 2004, Staveley Head, a UK-based

provider of insurance products compiled a list of countries with the lowest petrol prices in the world. It reported the listing which put Libya at third position with its low \$0, 14. (Global Humanitarian Index, 2014) In 2009, Libya was reported to be on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. (Grandville, 2012)

Furthermore, in 2010, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) confirmed that undernourishment was less than 5% with a daily calorie intake of 3144. It claimed that with the Great Man-Made River Project, Gaddafi was securing an even brighter agricultural future to feed his nation. On 21 February 2011, Gaddafi launched a programme to privatize all Libyan oil to every citizen of Libya. This would initially provide \$21,000 to every citizen from a total of \$32 billion in 2011 and effectively lead to the dissolution of the ministries of health, education and others to eliminate corruption, theft of oil by foreign companies and to decentralize power.

It is evident that Libya was very stable and wealthy under Late Gaddafi, as the citizens had access to every basic necessities of life. However, freedom to exercise their political rights and liberalism were not allowed and events and waves of the Arab uprising affected Libya during the last year of his administration.

FACTORS THAT LED TO THE FALL OF GHADAFI

Muammar Gaddafi style of leadership played a major role in his downfall. As noted in the JUST Commentary of March 2011 (Danladi, 2020) Gaddafi was an autocratic ruler who in the last two decades allowed wanton abuse of power, corruption and nepotism to discredit and destroy his leadership. There was hardly any latitude for freedom of expression in his highly personalized style of governance. Dissenters were imprisoned, tortured or killed.

These were some of the reasons why a sizeable segment of the citizenry turned against Gaddafi and his family. Some of the tribes and clans, respected grassroots religious figures, professionals and even members of his Cabinet and elements within the State’s security apparatus started to desert him from the early days of the uprising. A lot of young people in particular were determined to oust him.

Also, Gaddafi style and rules of engagement with his fellow leaders in the Arab world played a role in his downfall. Gaddafi had antagonized

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a number of them at Arab League and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meetings. It explains why the Arab League eagerly endorsed the idea of a “No Fly Zone” over Libya which effectively crippled Gaddafi’s air force. Qatar was directly involved in military operations, apart from helping to export oil controlled by the rebels and providing them with financial assistance. Like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates also helped to finance and train the rebel soldiers in Libya to fight Gaddafi forces.

The role of external military Alliance like NATO played a role in the fall of Gaddafi. It was NATO’s massive military involvement which brought down Gaddafi. NATO’s bombing campaign--- 20,000 sorties, with more than 7,500 strikes against ground targets--- pulverized Gaddafi’s military infrastructure. And, contrary to official denials, (Meijer 2017) Western military personnel, in unmarked combat clothing, not only provided training to the rebels but also accompanied them in their operations. In other words, there were Western boots on the ground in disguise. In the final assault upon Tripoli, it is alleged that NATO backed officers played a pivotal role in the planning and execution. Without NATO, Colonel John Ashley (rtd) has rightly posited that the rebels would not have succeeded in defeating the Gaddafi forces.

The media was also a significant factor. Arabic television channels gave full backing to the rebels. Al-Jazeera was an outstanding example of a television network that went out of its way to campaign for the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Arabic newspapers also got into the act. Needless to say, the mainstream Western media made no attempt to conceal its bias. In this regard, it is worth noting that the impact of social media was much less in the case of Libya compared to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Ghaddafi was later captured by the NATO forces led by French soldiers and killed in his state of Sirte in 2011.

LIBYA AFTER THE FALL OF GHADAFI

The most major impact of the Arab revolutions is the organization of a viable, genuine democratic political system. The first step in that direction is the organization of fair and free elections in Libya. The elections organized in the aftermath of the revolutions in Libya paved the way for a landslide victory of the Islamists. The high degree of coercion used by the former autocratic regime against the Islamists which had manifested in the arrest, detention, torture

and long imprisonment—in addition to the higher organizational capabilities of this group have facilitated their domination of this election.

It can be argued that one of the lessons learned from the Arab uprisings is that when the armed forces sided with the people, explicitly or implicitly, revolution was able to depose the regime in Libya. If the army was divided or did not support the demonstrators, the country involved was divided, a violent conflict erupted and the situation became much more complicated as it occurred in Libya in later stage of the revolution

The Libyan Army played central role in political systems of Libya, it played a crucial role in the developments of transition government. However, there were great differences in the nature of that role and its overall impact, which depended on various factors: force cohesion (a high level of cohesion in Egypt and Tunisia versus a lack of cohesion in Yemen and Libya); the nature of recruitment (professional in Egypt and Tunisia versus ideological, tribal or sectarian in Libya, Syria and Yemen); the degree of the army’s involvement in political life before the Arab uprisings (uninvolved in Tunisia versus playing a key role in Egypt, Syria and Yemen).

Dr. Fredrick Kachukwu has corroborated the pivotal role of the Army. According to him “the more professional and cohesive the army, and the less entangled it is in the political dynamics of the country, the more positive the role it can play in preserving the state and moving towards democracy.” (Kachukwu, 2020) Preserving cohesive and politically neutral armies in the region are essential, not only for security objectives, but also for preserving a horizon for state-building and stability where conflict and turmoil are now rampant. (Mauzaffar, 2011)

Many Arab countries have a long way to go in determining the role of the military in a manner that is consistent with democratic practices. The defence burden (defence expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic products, GDP) in a number of Arab countries is among the highest in the world and is a reflection of the role played by the army in these countries. In this context, the military’s budget and its conduct in Arab countries especially in Libya required serious consideration. The United Nations has been engaged in security-sector reform (SSR) for over two decades, but efforts to develop a common, coherent and coordinated approach began in 2006 with Slovakia’s initiative to put

this issue on the UN agenda. (Fauzzan, 2018) The UN continues to contribute to SSR through both operational activities and policy development. The African Union developed a continental policy framework, and conducts capacity-building activities on SSR.

The background of the successful use of social media in organizing the protests is in the limited freedom afforded to the people by the ruling regime. The rise of the new social media is contradictory as "it is often the government, aided by corporate interests, that promotes the new media thus inadvertently creating a space for civic activism." In Libya, Internet service was provided through the state-owned company Libya Telecom and Technology. "...the Internet was introduced to the general public in Libya in 2000 as part of the modernizing reforms of Muammar Gaddafi." In Tunisia, "...the government has energetically sought to spread Internet access." (Lynch, 2017) These together allowed for the introduction of social media sites to the populace in these countries. As more and more people became accustomed to this new technology the regime grasp on the new media forms weakened. This new form for uprisings allowed activists for the first time to use a mainstream mass media for its purposes. Regime control was lessened due to the underestimation of the powerful tools afforded to the populace by the Internet and through social media sites. For instance in Libya, where civil society has been oppressed the connections afforded both through social media sites and through the mobile phone network may have provided some necessary organizational infrastructure which previously did not exist. (Delacoura, 2011)

Social media gave protest groups internationally the power to learn from and talk to one another. It allows for massive leaderless uprisings without many of the problems, which leaderless groups had before. In the past a leaderless movement might have a problem with coordinating and setting up protests without a centralized leadership.

With social media they now had tools with which to organize on a level, which required only that people agree to show up to a protest on a certain date on Facebook. It can from their spread outside of the social media sites through word-of-mouth by those who have seen the event online. This also makes it increasingly difficult for regimes to oppress this form of protest due to a lack of a leadership with which

to target. Here, it is not possible to just cut off the head of the movement as protests and dissent will still continue to function. (Olatunde, 2020) The biggest problem with this form is seen in Libya where there is a certain lack of legitimacy for opposition forces due to there not being accepted leaders with which to present the opposition's views. It becomes more difficult to set up a politically viable opposition after-the-fact but it becomes an essential form in the beginning, as it is an effective tactic against oppressive regime control. Through social media people see the violence and therefore more inclined to join the protestors.

Gaddafi's son; Saif el-Islam blamed Facebook and Arab satellite TV channels for spreading lies Libya's massacres dominated Al-Jazeera's programmes and Arab social media sites for weeks increasing both domestic and international awareness. In the case of Mohammed Bouazizi, there was apparently a similar case in Monastir before that did not have the same effect. This is because the images of Bouazizi were shared through social networking sites and therefore it allowed a faster spread of the incident. In fact According to DeSoto's research team, thirty-five additional Arab small businessmen in 4 countries subsequently immolated themselves in solidarity with Bouazizi. (Desoto, 2011)

In 2008, protest movements against the Libya regime were crushed without significant backlash due to low penetration by the new online media. In Egypt, information on the brutal death of Khaled Said at the hands of Egyptian police was posted online and spread throughout both local and international conscience

Some states may have realized as well the usage of the new social media as a method of controlling information and spreading rumors that would favour the regimes.

The new media aided in the mobilization of resources as awareness of the protests and demonstrations grew and support was gained through new allies and resource being brought in by those sympathetic to the activists. It creates as well a political opportunity that did not exist before which may well be one of the many reasons for the success of these uprisings which fits well with the political process model of social movement theory. As well this means that it broke up the monopoly of the regime to frame events as they saw fit. The added

information as well coming in from the outside world may have created a view of relative deprivation due to comparisons with citizens of other nations. Vincent Cannistraro posits that“...

“The essentially leaderless protests in Libya and Egypt were afforded by the breakdown in government-controlled national opinion, made possible through a global technology available to almost everyone. (Cannistraro, 2020)

The use of social media indicated that the uprisings were supported largely by the youth, and is an indicative factor in calling the uprisings a “youth revolution”. The possible effect of social media was played down, or in some cases controlled through traditional methods (such as through physical intimidation by state forces inside of internet cafés until later on when powers were used to shut down or control social media at which point government efforts were effectively too late. As a Libyan citizen, Muhammad Abbas puts it “...we use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.” (Wickham, 2014) Traditional media, such as Arab satellite television, had perhaps a larger impact, as they were the means to which the information shared through social media sites they were able to permeate mainstream knowledge. While the role of social media should not be overly emphasized as the main reasons for the uprisings were the pre-existing revolutionary conditions and the inability of the state to contain the revolutionary upsurge which evolved from that. Social media nonetheless had a crucial role as a tool in the mobilization of uprisings as well as the spread of information throughout the Middle East and North Africa.

One of the main themes in these countries during the uprisings has been the rise of Islamist movements. These organizations have existed since the 1920s but in the 1970s Islamists movement became more attractive as Islam had a revival in society such as in the case of the Iranian revolution in 1979. The Muslim Brotherhood has spread throughout the Middle East but its importance in Egypt has had more meaning than in Tunisia, Libya and Syria.

Rosefely Wickham and Salwa Ismail argue convincingly that the programme of “civic obligation” that the Islamist movement upholds is in fact a hidden political agenda.” According to this thesis the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has a political agenda and has had it since its emergence. They have tried to reach their goals

through different means especially during uprisings where they presented their presidential candidate. In the other three countries the Muslim Brotherhood has been of lesser importance as in the case of Tunisia it was considered as a bad influence by the government. The organization did not exist in Tunisia but it influenced the political party Ennahda with its ideology and political agenda. The case of Libya is very similar to the one of Egypt as the Muslim Brotherhood is very rational and organized movement as it for example has formed its own political party – the Justice and Development Party.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATION OF GADDAFI FALL

The fall of Gaddafi launched a geopolitical tsunami across Africa and into the Middle East. Libya became a world’s largest loose arms cache, and its porous borders are routinely transited by a host of heavily armed non-state actors — including the Tuareg separatists and jihadists who forced Mali’s national military from Timbuktu and Gao in March 2012 with newly acquired weapons from Libya.(Aljazeera news, 2017) The UN has also documented the flow of arms from Libya into Egypt, Gaza, Niger, Somalia, and Syria.

In October 2013, 800 fighters loyal to Daesh seized control of Derna near the Egyptian border, some 200 miles from the European Union. Since then, Daesh’s Libyan branch has taken control of Sirte and gained a degree of influence in Benghazi, the nation’s second largest city and heart of the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi.

The group’s use of Libyan territory to terrorize and threaten other states has raised the international concern. In February, 2014 Daesh beheaded 21 migrant workers from Libya because they were Christians, then released a propaganda video containing footage of the heinous act. This acts attracted response by United Nations on the need to decide the fate of Libya political engineering

Ansar Bait al-Maqdis — the dominant jihadist group in the Egyptian Sinai —pledged allegiance to Daesh, as did Nigeria’s Boko Haram more recently. Daesh has also made direct threats against Italy, prompting officials in Rome to warn that Italy’s military may intervene in Libya to counter Daesh’s fighters. (Khan, 2020)

One quarter of Daesh's fighters in Derna come from other Arab countries and Afghanistan. A major influx of Jabhat al-Nusra fighters from Syria has also entered the fray in Libya. This underscores how Islamist extremists from lands far away have exploited Libya's status as a failed state. This development was most recently underscored when a Sudanese member of Daesh's Libya division carried out a suicide attack on April 5th, which targeted a security checkpoint near Misrata. The bloody incident resulted in four deaths and over 20 injuries.

Some states in Sub-Saharan Africa such as Chad and Sudan suggest that such international networks will continue to take advantage of frail central authorities and lawlessness throughout the extremely underdeveloped Sahel and other areas of the continent to spread their influence. In the absence of any political resolution to its civil war, Libya in particular — as a failed state with mountainous oil reserves — will remain vulnerable to extremist forces hoping to seize power amidst the ongoing morass.

Since the fall of Gaddafi, socio-economic situation in Libya is pathetic. All major infrastructure projects, which were in progress when the war erupted — many were in their final phase — have been suspended and looted as foreign investors who flocked to Libya before 2011 have left the country with no prospect of returning to Libya. Libya faced bankruptcy as its only source of hard currency, oil production, has fallen to one-quarter of what before 2011. (Davidson, 2013) Imran Khan lamented that, "Daily life for ordinary Libyans, in big cities and remote villages, over the last four years, has been a continuous struggle with high prices and all sorts of shortages. The hardest hits are large families that used to benefit from generous state subsidies that have now dried up. He stressed further that;

In Tripoli, power and fuel shortages dominate daily life. The average number of blackout hours reached 12 hours a day when I last visited Tripoli in October 2014. Now it has somewhat improved, but still power outages occur a minimum of nine hours a day and in some villages electricity is available only every other day. Cooking gas cylinders, if found on the black market, cost some 500 Libyan dinars (\$368), or five times what they used to be before the war. (Khan 2020)

Libya is also facing a multitude of political problems. The instability in Libya has created conditions for two governments, two

parliaments and two armies. These are elected Tobruk-based government headed by Abdullah al-Thani and the unelected Tripoli-based government headed by Omar al-Hasi claim working for the benefit of Libyans. (Pippin, 2011) Yet, they are unable to protect their citizens, solve simple electricity shortages, and provide medical care or security. Under the nose of both governments, the Islamic State and other extremist groups continue to operate with almost total impunity. The country itself is on the brink of dividing into its pre-1951 independence situation, where it used to have three semi-independent regions: Fezzan in the south, Tripolitania in the west and Cyrenaica in the east. The security situation in Libya is another terrible story after the fall of Gaddafi. As succinctly put by Faway Haniz

Parents do not know whether it is safe enough to let their children go unaccompanied to the local school. At night, one is likely to be declared missing if not home by 10 p.m. Most women do not drive any longer and stay mostly indoors for weeks on end. I still remember the times when I would rarely lock my car or my house, and women were safe to drive at night on Tripoli's main streets. Families would gather in cafes and at the seafront until late and nothing would threaten them. We, Libyans, used to take security and safety for granted. It was extremely rare to hear of an explosion or car bomb attack. Today, explosions and even suicide attacks are frequent in Tripoli. (Haniz, 2020)

All this while, the international community still cannot agree on any workable plan to stabilize Libya, except for the UN-brokered talks that took place in Morocco but produce no tangible results.

Since the assassination of Gaddafi, Libya is torn between two governments and dozens of militias and armed groups. Like many of their Middle Eastern neighbors in 2011, Libyans protested against a dictator hoping for more political freedom and an end to the Qaddafi regime's repressive four-decade-long reign. However, life for the average Libyan has become more dangerous and unstable than it was under Qaddafi. (Forsythe, 2012)

After the election of 2012, the government that emerged was unable to control the numerous militias and armed groups that gained power during the uprising, and skirmishes continued.

In May 2014, a renegade general, Khalifa Haftar, launched an assault on the Islamist

militias operating in the city of Benghazi. Libyans frustrated with the Islamist-dominated General National Congress (GNC) and its inability to bring stability elected a new legislative body — the internationally-recognized House of Representatives. Each of Libya's rival parliaments is roughly aligned with armed actors, with Haftar and his "Operation Dignity" fighters supporting the House of Representatives based in the northeastern city of Tobruk, while "Libya Dawn," an umbrella term that included Islamist militias and revolutionaries who battled Qaddafi, supported the GNC, based in Tripoli in the northwest. In all, an estimated 1,700 armed groups and militias are active in Libya since the fall of Ghadafi (Albright & Richard., 2012)

It is also estimated that 435,000 Libyans fled their homes to elsewhere in the country. Libyans reported that a third of those displaced within the country were living in "precarious" accommodations, including unfinished buildings, garages, collective shelters or public spaces.

The U.N. estimated that 2.44 million people — about a third of Libya's populations— have been affected by the fighting, which has led to shortages of food, water, and electricity and medical supplies and reduced access to health care and public services. As of June, an estimated 2.5 million Libyans needed access to health services, according to the U.N., and around 400,000 required food aid.

However, the situation in Libya is very pathetic since the beginning of the revolution and it remained worst despite the intervention of the United Nations. Although there intervention led to the death of Libyan leader Muammar Ghadafi, the undisputable fact is that life in Libya remained nasty, brutish and short till the end of 2015.

This study has addressed the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution in Libya. The 2011 Arab uprisings, which swept the entire Arab region, took people by surprise; for it had never been apprehended that such phenomena would take place. This in particular was the assertion of some Arab political analysts who had been arguing for quite some time that political stability and economic prosperity could only be promoted by autocratic authoritarian regimes. These political analysts strongly believed in the preponderant power of those authoritarian regimes and that no political forces

should dare to challenge them. But such assertions proved to be wrong, as the Arab people and in particular the young took to the streets and demonstrated against these autocratic regimes. This is an indication that Arab citizens managed to overcome their fear vis-à-vis the repressive state and hence restore their dignity. This in turn has necessitated the reassessment of political methodology which for quite some time ignored and underestimated the role that could be played by the unorganized radical political movements in Arab societies.

In the preceding analysis it has been shown how structural factors such as deteriorating economies, the uneven distribution of economic resources, the spread of poverty and unemployment, the repressive violent nature of the Arab regimes and corruption coupled with catalytic factors such as the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi (Tunisia) and the arrest and torture of Khaled Said in Egypt and Fathi Tirbal in Libya have been the major causes for the popular uprisings that swept the entire Arab region in 2011. In addition the study has revealed how some Arab regimes like Tunisia and Egypt—has immediately collapsed, while others have shown fierce resistance such as Libya and Yemen.

Although Libya was a relatively clear-cut case of the need for international intervention based on Responsibility to Protect (R2P), it occurred only due to a confluence of factors. France and the United Kingdom's insistence on intervention, the United States' endorsement, and Russia and China's reluctant abstentions paved the way. The outcome in Libya may have saved lives, but also had implications for the future of R2P.

The operation in Libya could not have happened without the military support and participation of the United States or the political efforts by Britain and France. Although the pro-intervention parties claimed the goal was not to remove Qaddafi by force, but "it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Qaddafi in power."The ambiguity of the phrase "all necessary measures" gave the coalition significant discretion in how to proceed. For France and Britain, intervention was contingent upon overthrowing Qaddafi, and NATO's subsequent actions indicate a determination to do so. NATO "was unequivocally committed to the rebel side, and to securing regime change, and acted accordingly militarily."

China's and Russia's perceptions were significantly influenced by the outcome of the Security Council's decision on Libya, which helped account for their greater resistance to NATO's implementation of Resolution 1973 may have threatened authorization of future actions with respect to R2P in the UNSC, if China and Russia continue to see such resolutions as masks for pursuing regime change.

The civil war in Libya has also changed the political history of the country and for the first time since 1969, elections held. Although, no major significant outcome in the election as a result of the bifurcation in the political and social life in Libya. The gospel fact is that the intervention of the United Nations ultimately led to the end of Gaddafi's oppressive and authoritarian rule in Libya.

CONCLUSION

This study has examined the socio-economic and political affairs in Libya since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. The outbreak of the Arab Spring played a larger role and the intervention of foreign nations and other international security alliances like the NATO, and Arab League. Gaddafi's reign was characterized by oppression, authoritarianism and absence of freedom. Although the socio-economic conditions of Libyans were far better than other Arab states that enjoyed the support of the leading democratic states like the United States, UK and France, hence, the need to allow liberal democracy and decolonization further triggered the uprising which led to the end of Gaddafi. Libya has remained a state in hopelessness and despair since the end of Gaddafi's regime. Peace and stability are no longer feasible as several ceasefire agreements led by Turkey and Russia have no significant impact on the quest for peace and stability which has the hallmark of a working state.

If Libya must have peace, the government must prioritize a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program. Such an initiative can help address the security and economic needs of fighters by either absorbing them into a reformed security apparatus or providing them alternative livelihood opportunities.

The government, working closely with the international community, must also ensure that rebuilding a national army and police force is done with core civilian protection objectives in mind, including vetting potential members for

human rights red flags; training them on protection principles and tactics, proper codes of conduct, and adequate nonlethal resources; and implementing accountability mechanisms for bad behavior.

For most Libyans, security forces conjure up a vision of an aggressive, repressive institution. The new Libyan forces must understand that their role is to protect and support—not ignore or prey on—Libya's citizens.

An essential component of security sector reform also includes overhauling the justice system to ensure the government is able to fairly and swiftly prosecute detainees held within state prisons and transfer detainees currently held in makeshift militia administered facilities that exist outside the state's purview. Many of these detainees have been held in detention facilities for more than a year without charges and should immediately be placed in the state's custody to have their cases assessed.

At the same time, the justice ministry should adopt a rights-based approach that emphasizes the constructive role the police, courts, and legal system play in helping build good governance and the rule of law. For a start, the ministry can unequivocally reject all forms of abuse, embrace the complementary role of civil society, and amend the amnesty law passed by the National Transitional Council that in essence codified impunity for rebels committing human rights violations in the name of the revolution.

Finally, as the courts get up and running, appropriate protection for prosecutors and witnesses involved in sensitive political trials will be essential. The new Libyan government should therefore call on NATO to open an investigation into these incidents and, based on its findings, provide compensation to the victims. While some Libyan civilians are reluctant to make such a request to NATO, the new government could easily overcome such concerns by stressing responsibility for any harm to its people.

Similarly, the Libyan government itself should make good on its commitment to provide assistance to the families of civilians caught in the crossfire during the revolution, just as they do to the families of martyrs. Regardless of which side they supported during the revolution, such efforts can play an important role in helping encourage reconciliation—and the new government has an obligation under human rights law to compensate victims.

By taking these steps the new government could dignify the families who were victims of the revolution and, in some cases, diffuse lingering hostility in the post-Qaddafi era.

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